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Introduction
The literature dealing with excess consumption in the health care sector is
dichotomic. Indeed, we distinguish overconsumption which comes from the
so-called ex post moral hazard behavior.1 (i.e the fact that policy holders'
health expenditure increases with their coverage) and which comes from a
supply induced demand effect, attributed to providers' moral hazard behav-
ior.2.
The ex post moral hazard inefficiency comes from the policy holders'
overconsumption (Pauly, 1968). This overconsumption effect can be reduced
trough co-payment mechanisms such as deductible and coinsurance rates.3
The goal of this literature is then to determine the co-payment mechanisms
and the co-payment level that implements the optimal trade-off between risk
mutualization on one hand and the reduction of the inefficiency on the other
hand. An important aspect of this literature is that the policy holders' health
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care demand is considered. Providers' influence in the determination of the
policy holders' health care consumption is then ignored.
At the opposite, a large literature deals with providers moral hazard
behavior or supply induced demand (SID) 4. Most of the time, providers
have an informational advantage thanks to their diagnosis and they can used
it to induce the policy holders demand function. The goal of this literature is
to find the optimal remuneration system that minimizes the overconsumption
of health care due to the SID's effect.
There are no articles so far that analyze the impact of co-payment mech-
anisms on providers' ability to induce demand of their patients. We assume
that providers' objective functions depend on their profit and on their pa-
tients' utilities captured by an altruism parameter which weighs the patients'
utilities. In the particular case where providers are completely altruist, they
would become perfect agents for their patients and only ex post moral hazard
matters. We shall remark that the providers' ability to induce the patients'
health care demands depends on the policy holders financial participation.
The Higher is the co-payment, the lower is their ability to induce demand.
The goal of this paper is to take into account this impact in determining the
optimal co-payment system. In the same framework, we shall analyze the
optimal remuneration of the providers.
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